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Resumen
Durante la década de los noventa, el mundo experimentó una ola de acuerdos de integración regional
(AIR) que alcanzaron proporciones sin precedentes. En presencia de economías de escala o efectos de
tamaño del mercado, los AIR pueden tener consecuencias positivas sobre el crecimiento. Este artículo
introduce una nueva medida de integración regional, al hacer interactuar la calidad de miembro de un
país en el AIR con la participación de los socios en el PIB mundial. Esta medida permite capturar
efectos diferenciados, dependiendo del tamaño de los socios. Los resultados indican que los AIR han
tenido efectos positivos en el crecimiento. Además, se encuentra que los acuerdos Norte-Norte tienen
efectos significativos en el crecimiento; los acuerdos Sur-Sur tienen efectos ambiguos, que dependen
del tamaño de los países que los suscriben; y para los acuerdos entre Norte y Sur, no hay respuesta
clara.
Abstract
During the 1990’s the world experienced a new wave of regional integration agreements (RIAs) that
reached unprecedented proportions. In the presence of economies of scale or extent-of-the market
effects RIAs may have positive growth effects. I introduce a new measure of regional integration by
interacting country membership to a RIA and the partners’ share of world GDP, which allows
capturing differentiated effects depending on the size of the partners.  Results indicate that RIAs have
exerted positive effects on growth. In addition, I find that North-North agreements have significant
growth effects; South-South agreements have ambiguous effects depending on the size of the countries
joining them, and that there is no clear answer for North-South agreements.
________________
This paper has been presented at the joint Central Bank of Chile-World Bank Conference “The Future





The increasing importance of regional integration agreements (RIAs) and in particular their 
extraordinary expansion during the 1990’s are among the most salient developments of the 
international trading system. The evolution of the European Community into the European 
Union with a deeper level of integration, the creation of NAFTA and MERCOSUR, the revival 
of old arrangements such as the Andean Pact and ASEAN, and a new wave of bilateral 
agreements involving Latin American countries are examples of this phenomenon. 
A first assessment of the extent of the expansion of RIAs can be obtained by examining 
Table 1, which shows the number of notifications to GATT/WTO of regional integration 
agreements. An important first wave of agreements was observed in the 1970’s, and a second 
larger one—the revival of regional integration—during the 1990’s. This last wave of agreements 
accounts for 52% of the notified RIAs as of 1998.
1 At present most countries in the world are 
members of at least one RIA, and at least one third of world trade is covered by RIA provisions 
(World Bank, 2000). 
These developments have attracted academic attention, generating a large literature that 
seeks to explain the welfare properties of RIAs and their effects on trade.
2 Relatively less 
attention, at both the theoretical and empirical levels, has been devoted to the growth effects of 
RIAs, even though it has been recognized that the dynamics effects of regional integration are 
potentially larger than the static ones (Walz, 1999). 
The way in which the empirical literature has tried to assess whether regional integration 
affects economic growth has been through the use of dummy variables for a country’s 
participation in an RIA. They have been used in both cross section and panel data growth 
regressions, with findings that mostly point towards a lack of growth effects of regional 
integration. An important disadvantage of this approach is that a categorical variable will not 
capture countries’ features that may have growth effects once an integration agreement is in 
place. In other words a dummy variable measures the impact or regional integration with error, 
                                                 
1 A word of caution regarding these numbers is necessary. Not all agreements will result in a net increase of the number of 
agreements in force since some of them will replace existing agreements. 
2 See De Melo and Panagariya (1993), Kym and Blackhurst (1993), Baldwin and Venables (1995), and Baldwin (1997), among 
others, for discussions on these and related issues.   
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which in turn may explain why empirical studies have generally found that regional integration 
has not affected growth significantly either positive or negatively.  
This paper contributes to the literature along several lines: first and mainly, I introduce a 
new way to measure regional integration by creating an RIA variable that not only considers 
whether a group of countries has an RIA, but also captures the extent of the world market that is 
integrated into domestic markets once the agreement takes place. This is a clear improvement to 
the existing literature, for it uses additional and relevant information about the countries joining 
the RIA—at the same time that reduces its measurement error—in order to identify possible 
growth effects coming from the expansion of the market size. 
In addition, I improve the literature by addressing endogeneity problems that might arise 
with regional integration, as it might be the case that growth and the decision to join certain RIAs 
are driven by common underlying factors that would bias current estimates from their true 
values. This problem has not been addressed before, and I deal with it by proposing a set of 
instruments comprised of regional dummies.  
By analyzing the growth effects of size of the market, I find strong evidence that extending 
the domestic market through RIAs fosters growth, irrespective of the estimation method. In turn, 
this finding supports theoretical arguments that suggest positive effects of RIAs through the 
extent of the market. My estimates indicate that signing an agreement with a country whose GDP 
is 1 percent of world GDP increases growth by 0.026 to 0.1 percentage points, with the lower 
bound being the most appropriate one.
3 To put these results in context, an agreement with a 
country the size of Canada—whose share of world GDP in 2000 was approximately 2.1%—
might increase growth by 0.05 to 0.021 percentage points.  
With these point estimates we can, for instance, estimate the impact of the expected 
enlargement of the European Union, which would increase the growth rate of existing members 
by 0.02 percentage points. For incoming members such as Poland and Hungary, the increase in 
their growth rates might reach up to 0.6 percentage points. Considering that the worldwide 
annual average GDP growth rate during the 1990-2000 period was 2.6 percent,
4 the gains from 
regional integration agreements are not trivial. 
 
                                                 
3 The magnitude of the growth effect varies depending on the estimation procedure.   
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A second contribution of this paper is the finding that when countries are classified as 
North or South—depending on their development level—those agreements between North 
countries have unambiguous positive growth effects. In turn, the growth effect of an agreement 
between South or developing countries depends on the size of its partners. For sufficiently large 
countries the effect is positive but for very small countries the effect is negative.  For North-
South agreements the evidence is mixed and does not allow me to conclude either in favor or 
against growth effects of regional integration.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the literature on growth and 
regional integration. Section 3 discusses the measures of regional integration that I constructed, 
the data, and estimation strategies. Section 4 presents the results of introducing a new measure of 
regional integration, addresses some endogeneity concerns, and discusses the implications for 
different types of agreements. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. GROWTH AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
 
Relatively little attention has been devoted to study the growth effects of regional 
integration. Notable exceptions are the contributions of Walz (1995, 1997a, 1997b, 1999). Using 
dynamic general equilibrium growth models that account for regional aspects, he finds that the 
growth rate after integration depends on several factors, such as whether the integration 
agreement causes trade creation or trade diversion, the comparative advantage of each member, 
and initial trade barriers. Given this simultaneous dependence of the growth rate on several 
factors, the endogenous growth literature that analyzes regional integration does not have a clear 
answer to the question of what are its effects on growth.  
However, it has been long thought that the potential dynamic effects of regional 
integration might be important (Baldwin, 1989). One of the possible sources of dynamic effects 
are economies of scale. Walz (1997) points out that assuming increasing returns to scale in the 
R&D sector, scale effects would come from increases in productivity of this sector due to the 
expansion in the size of the market after integration. In this line, openness has been found to 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 The World Bank. World Development Report 2002.  
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reduce the effect of the size of the domestic market on growth (Ades and Glaeser 1999), yet, no 
attempt has been made to test the impact on growth of the enlargement of foreign markets 
through regional integration agreements. 
In a related literature, although not concerned with growth but with income 
convergence/divergence, Puga and Venables (1998) have reached conclusions regarding the 
effects of different types of agreements on income and welfare. Specifically, they investigate the 
effects of trade arrangements between developed and developing countries, i.e., North-South and 
South-South agreements, on industrial development. They conclude that unilateral liberalization 
is beneficial, but also that the gains from an integration agreement are likely to be larger. 
Moreover, they find that North-South agreements are more likely to bring greater gains to 
developing countries—if not to North countries as well—than South-South agreements.  
Following a different approach related to traditional trade theories and using two different 
models, Venables (1999) shows that comparative advantages, coming from endowments of 
human capital, can provide similar conclusions to those of Puga and Venables (1998). His 
argument is simple: countries with comparative advantage closer to the world average have a 
lower risk of trade diversion—the source of losses of income and welfare—once a free trade area 
is formed, and countries with the comparative advantage most different from the world average 
have a higher risk of trade diversion. His conclusions lead to the following implications: on the 
one hand, a free trade area formed by developing countries—with lower relative endowments of 
human capital than the world average but different among them—might lead to divergence of 
income levels, with the richer partner—the one with endowments closer to world average—
benefiting at the expense of the poorer. On the other hand, an agreement containing a high 
income partner—one with relative endowment of human capital above the world average—is 
more likely to lead to income convergence.  
Although it is not possible to find an unambiguous prediction in the theory regarding the 
growth effects of regional integration, it is possible to extract some guidelines regarding what 
type of agreements might have positive growth effects: Puga and Venables (1998) and Venables 
(1999) suggest agreements that include at least one developed partner increase growth. In the 
present paper I contribute to the literature by developing a variable that tests this hypothesis 
empirically. The methodology used in this test and its results are reported in sections 3 and 4 
respectively.  
  5
    The empirical literature
5 has addressed regional integration by including dummy 
variables as the measure of regional integration. Using cross-section growth regressions, De 
Melo  et al. (1992) and Vamvakidis (1998) found that for several integration agreements a 
dummy variable reflecting membership does not have a significant effect on growth. In a related 
paper, Vamvakidis (1999) addresses the question of whether countries engaging in unilateral 
liberalizations grow faster than countries that engage in regional integration agreements. Results 
show that economic growth is greater in countries that accomplish broad liberalization than in 
countries that engage in RIAs, specifically he finds that becoming a member of at least one RIA 
does not foster growth. 
Recently, Henrekson et al. (1997) test the growth effects of European integration, namely 
the growth effects of both the European Community and the European Free Trade Agreement, 
finding that the EC/EFTA dummy variable is positive and significant at the 5% level, suggesting 
that the growth rate is increased in a range of 0.6-0.8 percentage points by EC/EFTA 
membership. 
The use of a dummy variable is prevalent not only at the country level, but also in studies 
using industry data. Madani (2001a and 2001b) looks at the effect of the revival of the Andean 
Pact and ASEAN on industrial growth,
6 finding that for both groups the dummy variable used to 
estimate growth effects is not significant. 
Using a dummy variable to capture the growth effects of an RIA is akin to assuming that 
the expected effect would come simply from signing the agreement. Instead, we should expect 
that characteristics of the agreement and its partners, such as the level of integration, economic 
development or market size, would be forces driving the gains in growth. For instance, if we 
expect agreements involving countries of different sizes to have differentiated effects depending 
on the size of the partners joining the agreement, using a dummy variable will not give the 
meaningful estimates because a dummy variable in this context introduces a large measurement 
error in the integration variable.
7 Variables that reduce measurement error by incorporating the 
                                                 
5 I will discuss only studies involving econometric techniques because of the similarities to this paper. There is also a literature 
using computable general equilibrium methods. For a basic survey on computable general equilibrium evaluations see Baldwin 
and Venables (1995). 
6 The Andean Pact countries analyzed are Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador. The ASEAN countries are Singapore, Philippines, 
and Malaysia. 
7 Henceforth, I will use ‘size’ to refer to a country’s GDP.  
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dimensions that might generate growth effects, such as the size of the market, would generate 
more consistent and economically meaningful estimates.  
In summary, theory does not provide indications about the expected impact of regional 
integration on growth, although it is possible to indirectly extract some guidelines regarding the 
type of agreements that might have positive effects: those that include at least one developed 
partner. The empirical literature, by using a dummy variable to measure the impact of RIA 
membership, has ignored the fact that impacts are likely to depend on market size. 
 
 
3. MEASURING REGIONAL INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS, ESTIMATION STRATEGY, AND DATA 
 
I measure the growth effects of regional integration—presumably through economies of 
scale—by creating a variable (RIA) that captures the extent of the world market that is potentially 
incorporated into the domestic market with the set of regional integration agreements that a 











it jt SWGDP D RIA   Absolute ,  (1)
where N is the number of countries in the world, 
j
it D is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
when country j has an integration agreement with country i in period t, and SWGDPi is the share 
of world GDP of country i.
8 The variable, therefore, is the sum of the shares of world GDP of the 
countries with which country j has signed regional integration agreements. The size of the 
partners’ market that is being incorporated to their domestic market is potentially different for 
each country signing the agreement. As a result, countries entering an agreement are going to 
enlarge their domestic markets differently, thus facing different prospects for growth 
improvements. This measure of integration is a clear improvement in the direction of reducing 
the measurement problem posed by the use of dummy variables, and it will permit different 
growth estimates for each of the countries entering an agreement.  
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The RIA variable presented in equation 1 measures the absolute the size of the market, 
however, it is possible that economies of scale could appear not only from increasing the market 
in absolute terms but also in relative terms. In order to capture that effect I constructed a measure 
of the size of partners’ market relative to the size of the country entering the agreement, to test 
whether the relative size of the incorporated market and not the absolute size is what determines 



















were the numerator of equation (2) is equation (1), and SWGDPj is the share of world GDP of 
country j. Therefore, the relative RIA variable conveys information regarding the size of the 
partners’ market relative to the domestic market. These two RIA variables will be contrasted 
with a variable in line with the existing literature, a dummy variable reflecting whether a country 
belongs to at least one RIA.  
Appendix 1 contains the list of regional integration agreements incorporated in the RIA 
variables. They include a wide variety of trade agreements—in total 70 of them—covering all 
continents, countries with a diverse degree of development, and a long period of time.
9 The main 
criterion used to include agreements in the data set is that they have to be deemed as active as of 
January 1, 2000 by the World Trade Organization (WTO). In addition, I include also some 
agreements, particularly in Latin America, that have not been notified to the WTO but were 
considered active by other sources. 
The basic estimation strategy is through cross-country and panel data growth regressions 
that incorporate the RIA variables I constructed. To capture possible economies of scale or 
extent-of-the-market effects of regional integration I introduce a set of control variables that 
intend to capture other sources of growth—factor accumulation, allocative efficiency, 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 I use countries’ share of world GDP in 1960 to avoid problems of reverse causation. However, this choice might introduce 
measurement error into the RIA measure as not all countries grew at the same rate over the period. The results reported here are 
robust to a measure of RIA that uses the observed shares of world GDP at every point in time instead of fixed ones. 
9 To my knowledge, this is the study that incorporates the largest number of trade agreements, and has the longest time coverage 
so far in the literature.  
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technological transitions, government policies and institutions—so that the integration variable I 
created reflects the effect of economies of scale or extent-of-the-market on growth.
10 
Growth is measured by the growth rate of real GDP per capita at international prices, i.e., 
purchasing power parity adjusted. The choice of the control variables is based directly on both 
the theoretical and empirical growth literature. In the first case, endogenous growth theory 
recognizes that capital accumulation, skilled labor, and knowledge transmission and 
accumulation are major driving forces of growth (Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1990a and 1991b; 
Grossman and Helpman, 1991). To proxy for capital accumulation I included the investment 
rate, and for skilled labor I use human capital measured as the average secondary and tertiary 
years of schooling in total population. Capturing knowledge transmission is more controversial 
and several variables have been proposed in the literature. Following Wacziarg (2001), I use 
foreign direct investment and manufactured exports as a share of total exports. 
Given that the decision of joining regional integration agreements is ultimately a political 
one, an important econometric concern can be the possible correlation between government 
policies that might have growth effects and the political decision of entering integration 
agreements. I address this concern by including a measure of government size—the ratio of 
government consumption over GDP. I also incorporate a measure of the political system to 
control for the type of institutions countries have. Following Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) I use 
a variable that assesses the level of democracy.  
Recognizing that trade restrictions affect tradable goods prices and that price distortions 
have been found to deter growth (Easterly, 1989 and 1993), I include the black market premium 
as proxy for distortionary policies. Next, I introduce terms of trade with the aim of avoiding 
possible correlations between international price movements and the decision of joining 
integration agreements. Additionally, I use the ratio of total trade over GDP to control for the 
country’s degree of openness. 
Recent literature has provided evidence on the possibility of growth spillovers across 
countries (Chua 1993, Moreno and Trehan 1997, Easterly and Levine 1998, Easterly 2001), thus, 
                                                 
10 Given that it is not possible to control perfectly for all previous sources of growth, and that technological transmissions and 
knowledge spillovers are admittedly difficult to control for, it is likely that the RIA variable, to some extent, is also capturing 
technological transmissions and knowledge spillover effects.  
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I introduced the growth rate of trade partners to capture part of such spillovers.
11 It tries to 
capture the possibility that countries trading with fast-growing economies experience faster 
growth themselves, pulled by their partners. The trading partners’ growth rate is a weighted 
average of the growth rate of other countries, where weights are given by share of the bilateral 
trade between a given pair of countries.  
As Moreno and Trehan (1997), and Easterly and Levine (1998) have pointed out, the use 
of this variable introduces a problem of simultaneity in the regressions—the right hand side of 
the regression includes the dependent variable, growth.
12 In order to solve the simultaneity 
problem I use instrumental variables that endogenize trading partners’ growth. The instrument I 
propose is the trading partners’ investment rate. The trading partners’ investment rate is a 
weighted average of the investment rate existing in other countries, with weights being the shares 
of bilateral trade. The use of this instrument is justified by the fact that the empirical literature 
has found that the rate of investment is an important predictor of economic growth (Levine and 
Renelt, 1992), thus, ex-ante, trading partners’ investment would appear to be a suitable 
instrument for trading partners’ growth.
13,14 In turn, conditional on trading partner’s growth we 
should not expect trading partner investments to be a determinant of growth as the growth 
spillovers should come directly from other countries’ growth paths and not from their investment 
rate evolution. 
The last control variable is the share of world GDP of bordering countries. This variable is 
introduced to control for the possibility that the RIA variables might be capturing the growth 
effect coming from the market size of neighboring countries and not from regional integration 
since regional integration agreements are frequently formed by neighboring countries. 
 
                                                 
11 Here trade partners refer to all trading partners regardless of the existence of an integration agreement. See Appendix 2 for 
details about the construction of this variable. 
12 The baseline regression in this paper—in matrix notation—is the following: 
ε β θ + + = X WG G , where ε ~ N(0,σ
2I), Xβ is a matrix including all control variables and the RIA variables, W is the weighting 
matrix formed by shares of bilateral trade, and G is the growth vector. The product of W and G is the trading partners’ growth 
variable. Given that growth is on both sides of the equation the simultaneity problem arises. 
13 In all my estimations, I also find that a country’s own investment rate is a significant determinant of growth.  
14 In addition, I constructed trading partners’ growth using a different growth rate than the one used for the dependent variable.  
For the latter, I use the growth rate of real GDP per capita—purchasing power parity adjusted—because it better captures changes 
in the standard of living. For the trading partners’ growth variable, the growth rate is constructed from GDP per capita at constant 
dollars. This rate of growth measures the ability of countries to engage in international transactions of goods, services, capital 
and/or knowledge—the channels through which growth spillovers might operate—and therefore, the use of GDP per capita in 
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Table 2 provides basic statistics about the set of variables used in subsequent estimations. 
From the absolute RIA variable one can notice that on average, for the 1960-1999 period, trade 
agreements potentially add to a domestic market a market of the size of about 6.3% of the 
world’s GDP. It ranges from zero for countries such as China, Japan or Panama to 30.4% for 
Israel.
15 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of decade averages for economic growth and the RIA 
variables since part of the estimation is conducted using decade averages. Noticeable is the 
sustained increase in the averages and maximums of the absolute RIA variable. The former has 
increased from 1.74% in the sixties up to 10.8% in the 1990’s, and the latter has moved from 
14.3% in the 1960s to 68.8% in the same period.
16 The same table also reports descriptive 
statistics for the relative RIA variable, which on average also has experienced a substantial 
increase. Given that there is a large variance in the distribution of economic size in the world, 
this variance is also transmitted to the relative size variable, which has a relatively large standard 
deviation of about four times the mean in each decade.   
Table 4 displays the unconditional correlations between growth and the absolute and 
relative RIA variables. As can be seen, there seems to exist a moderate positive correlation 
between growth and these two variables, although for the absolute RIA variables it has changed 
over time—specifically, it decreases during the 1970’s, recovers during the next decade, only to 
decrease again in the 1990’s.
17 A plausible explanation for the decrease during the 1970’s could 
be that the oil price shock may have weakened the relationship. In order to control for this 
possibility, estimations control for shocks in the terms of trade and incorporate decade dummy 
variables in the panel data estimations.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
constant dollars assures a better proxy for such ability. The correlation between these two growth rates is 0.43, which helps to 
lessen the simultaneity problem. 
15 China, Japan and Panama have no reported integration agreements. 
16 The share of the world GDP is kept constant at 1960 values in all RIA calculations. 




In this section I report the results using the RIA variables created in section 3 in both 
cross-section and panel data growth regressions. I also address concerns related to the 
endogeneity of regional integration agreements, and I study the role of the level of development 
in generating growth effects. 
 
4.1. GROWTH EFFECTS OF RIAS: IS THE SIZE OF THE MARKET IMPORTANT?  
 
The first estimation exercise involves cross-section growth regressions using 40-year 
averages for the 1960-1999 period, with least squares and instrumental variables. The 
instrumental variables regressions controls for the simultaneity problem already discussed in 
section 3, and they have trading partners’ investment as the instrument for trading partner’s 
growth. 
Regressions incorporate all controls variables discussed above, namely, the logarithm of 
initial GDP per capita, the ratio of government consumption over GDP, the black market 
premium, the investment rate, foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP, the share of 
manufactured exports in total exports, the terms of trade, the ratio of total trade over GDP, 
trading partner’s growth, and bordering countries share of world GDP. In terms of the sample 
size, the regressions include 81 countries.
18 
Results are shown in Table 5. In columns 1 and 2, I first report results using a dummy 
variable that captures whether the country belongs to at least one RIA.
1 In this set of regressions 
belonging to an RIA means that a country joined at least one agreement before 1980. I 
constructed this variable to contrast results using the RIA variables that I introduce in this paper, 
with variables similar to the ones used so far the literature, in particular the one proposed by 
Vamvakidis (1999). According to Vamvakidis, and most of the empirical literature, I should 
expect this variable to be insignificant, and in fact, as in his paper, becoming a member of a RIA 
does not have any significant effect on growth.  
                                                 
18 Appendix 3 contains the list of the 81 countries included in regressions using 40-year averages.  
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In terms of the control variables, results indicate that the log of initial GDP per capita, the 
investment rate, manufactured exports, and bordering countries’ share of world GDP have the 
expected signs and are statistically significant with OLS. Similar results are obtained with 
instrumental variables (column 2).
19 In terms of the quality of the proposed instrument for 
trading partners’ growth, and following Bound et al. (1995), I report in the lower part of the 
table—in column 2—the F-statistics and the partial R-squared of the excluded instrument in the 
first-stage regression.
20 The F-statistic reveals that trading partners’ investment is significant at 
any standard level confidence, and the partial R-squared indicates that it explains 49% of the 
trading partners’ growth variation left after ‘partialling-out’ the included covariates. Thus, 
trading partners’ investment is a suitable instrument for trading partners’ growth. However, a 
Hausman specification test of the null hypothesis that no systematic differences exists in the 
instrumental variables and least squares coefficients fails to reject the null hypothesis, indicating 
that least squares should be preferred to instrumental variables.
21  
Column 3 reports the least squares regression but now introducing the absolute RIA 
variable presented in section 3 (equation 1), namely, the extent of the market included in all 
agreements to which each country belongs. The OLS estimates of the coefficient on the absolute 
RIA variable indicate that the extent of the market has a positive and significant effect on 
growth, a result that contrasts with outcomes obtained using traditional dummies that measure 
integration.  
Column 4 displays instrumental variables estimates. Again, as in the OLS estimates, the 
instrumental variables estimate for the RIA variable is positive and statistically significant. The 
instrument for trading partners’ growth, i.e. trading partners’ investment, performs well, both in 
terms of its significance in the first-stage regression—the F-statistics is 67.1, meaning that the 
                                                 
19 The main purpose of this paper is to discuss the effect of regional integration agreements on growth; therefore, I will focus the 
analysis mostly on the RIA variables, without deeply discussing results on control variables, since they have been already 
discussed in the literature. 
20 Excluded instrument refers to that used in the first-stage regression but not included in the second-stage regression. Included 
instruments refer to all other exogenous variables used to identify the endogenous variable. For Table 5, the excluded instrument 
is trading partners’ investment. Thus, the F-statistic is that for trading partners’ investment on the regression of the RIA variable 
on all control variables and trading partners’ investment (first-stage). The partial R-squared is the R-squared with the included 
instruments ‘partialled-out’ (Green, 2000). 
21 The Hausman specification test is based on the chi-squared statistic:  
) ˆ ˆ ( ]) ˆ [ ] ˆ [ ( )' ˆ ˆ ( 1
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV Var Var H β β β β β β − − − = − , where  ] ˆ [ i Var β is a covariance matrix. If  ] ˆ [ ] ˆ [ OLS IV Var Var β β < the 
chi-squared statistic would take a negative value, which is inconsistent with the definition of a chi-squared statistic. In that case, 
following Green (2000), the term containing the difference in the covariance matrices is assumed to be a zero matrix, thus, the 
chi-squared statistic is zero. Below the ‘Hausman’ statistic I report the corresponding p-value.  
  13
instrument is significant at any conventional significance level—and in terms of its explanatory 
power on the absolute RIA variable—the partial R-squared of trading partners’ growth is 0.5. 
Although, trading partners’ investment is a suitable instrument for trading partners’ growth on 
account of these two measures, again the Hausman specification test indicates that least squares 
is the appropriate estimation procedure.  
In terms of the control variables, in both the least squares and instrumental variables 
regressions the log of initial GDP per capita, government consumption, the investment rate, and 
bordering countries share of world GDP have the expected signs and are statistically significant, 
all results that are in line with those in the literature.
22 
One of the contributions of the absolute RIA variable I use in this paper is that it allows 
us to find differentiated growth effects varying with the size of RIA partners. The estimates I 
find suggest that joining an agreement with countries with a share of the world GDP of 1% might 
increase the growth rate, in the long-run, by 0.055 percentage points. To put this result in 
perspective the estimated coefficient suggests that signing an agreement with countries such as 
Canada or France—that accounted for 2.1% and 5.4% of world GDP in 2000, respectively—
would increase a country’s growth rate by 0.12% and 0.3% percentage points, respectively. In 
contrast, signing an agreement with countries such as Egypt or Colombia—with a share of world 
GDP of 0.24% and 0.3% percentage points, respectively—would increase growth by 0.013 and 
0.016 percentage points, respectively. The implication of this result is that countries would 
benefit more by signing agreements with larger partners.  
In addition to the effect coming from the absolute size of the market, I have created a 
variable that measures the relative size of the integration partners, i.e., the relative RIA variable, 
and columns 5 and 6 report results using this variable. With both least squares and instrumental 
variables, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant, which indicates that the relative 
size of the market also matters. Again the Hausman specification test indicates that least squares 
are the most appropriate estimates for this model.  
In order to obtain an indication of the economic importance of this effect, I will use the 
distribution of relative sizes of all pairs of countries in the world, which can be described as 
follows: the 75
th percentile has a value of 14.3, meaning that in 25% of all possible pairs of 
                                                 
22 See among others Levine (1992), Brunetti (1997), Easterly and Levine (1998), and Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000).  
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countries in the world, and therefore of possible bilateral integration agreements, one of the 
partners is at least 14 times the size of the other.
23 With this difference in sizes, an integration 




th percentile of the distribution of relative size has a value of 110.5 times, giving a 
growth effect of 0.07 percentage points; the mean is 136.5 times, which gives a possible average 
growth effect of 0.086 percentage points, and a 95
th percentile value of 358 times, giving a 
growth effect of 0.23 percentage points. The point estimates reported in Table 2 imply that the 
growth effect of the relative size of the market becomes economically significant only when 
extremely small countries engage in agreements with large countries. 
Columns 7 and 8 introduce both RIA variables—absolute and relative—at the same time, 
finding that both variables remain significant, and the Hausman specification test again rejects 
the instrumental variables estimates. The decrease in the significance level of the RIA variables 
is due to collinearity between them, since the relative RIA variable is constructed using the 
absolute RIA variable. In addition, a test of the joint significance of both RIA variables—
reported in the last row of the table—indicates that they are jointly significant.  
With the estimates of the RIA variables presented en Table 5, column 7, I can estimate 
the possible growth effects of potential integration agreements. For instance an agreement 
between The Unites States and Brazil, within the framework of the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA), would increase the growth rate of the Unites States by 0.12 percentage points 
and that of the Brazil by 1.4 percentage points, with almost all the effect coming from the 
absolute size of the market—given that the US economy is about 11.5 times the size of Brazil’s 
economy, the effect from the relative RIA variable is almost negligible for both countries. In 
contrast, an agreement between Canada and Bolivia would increase their growth by 0.001 and by 
0.14 percentage points, respectively. For Bolivia 25% of that increase would come from the 
effect of the relative RIA variable, since Canada is about 87 times larger, and for Canada all the 
effect would be generated by the absolute size of the market. 
In order to exploit the time series dimension of the data, I estimated both country fixed 
and random effect models. A panel approach has several advantages vis-à-vis a cross-section 
                                                 
23 The inverse is also true: in 25% of all possible pairs of countries, the total GDP of one of the partners is 0.07 times the other.  
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one. First, by using decade-averages of the variables it reduces measurement error problems. In 
this in particular, it helps to decrease the measurement error in the independent variables of 
interest, the RIA variables. For instance, for the case of the absolute RIA, which in practice 
increases over time for all countries, decade averages will capture better that evolution, in 
contrast with the cross-section approach in which—obviously—only one value of the variable is 
used.
25Another advantage of the panel approach is that allows incorporating the impact of time-
specific and country-specific effects on growth. The former can control for worldwide changes in 
the growth rate due to worldwide business cycle, and the later control for time invariant country-
specific determinant of growth such as the geography, climate, culture, or history. Panel data also 
allow for more variation in the data and therefore for reduction in the degree of collinearity in the 
covariates and for possible gains in efficiency (Baltagi, 2001).  
The results are reported in Table 6 and they in line with those obtained with cross-section 
regressions. First, I introduce a variable for whether a country belongs to at least one RIA. A 
country is considered to belong to a RIA if it joined the agreement during the first half of the 
decade. The point estimate indicates that belonging to at least one agreement does not have any 
significant growth effect, which again points out the lack of explanatory power of a dummy 
variable as a measure of regional integration (columns 1 and 2). Second, even after controlling 
for country fixed effects, which leaves only the within country variation as a source to explain 
changes in the growth rate, the absolute RIA variable appears to have a significant positive 
growth effect (columns 3 and 4). The Hausman specification test indicates that there is 
significant difference in the coefficients of the two models, thus rendering the country-fixed 
effects as the appropriate ones.  
Third, the estimated coefficients on the relative RIA variables are also positive and 
significant in both models, with country fixed effects being more suitable according to the 
Hausman specification test (columns 5 and 6). However, when both RIA variables are introduced 
at the same time, results indicate that both the absolute and the relative RIA variables are 
insignificant. As before, one explanation for the lack of significance of the RIA variables is  
                                                                                                                                                             
24 The effect on the growth rate of the larger country would be 0.00004 percentage points. 
25 The choice of the way in which that value is measured becomes even more important in cross-section estimates, as different 
approaches can give very different values for a time-variant variable. For instance one could choose using the average of the 
whole period (as implemented here). Another possibility is to use the value of the variable in the time mid-point of the sample. 
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collinearity between the two RIA variables, caused by their high correlation, especially during 
the first part of the sample period. The unconditional correlation between the RIA variables was 
0.84 in the 1960’s; it decreased to about 0.4 in the next two decades, and fell to 0.36 in the 
1990’s. Even though the RIA variables are not significant individually, an F-test (reported in the 
last row of the table) suggests that are they jointly significant in both models.
26 
Using the estimates reported in Table 6a, column 7, and taking the coefficients of the 
RIA variables as jointly significant, the expected growth effect of regional integration of the 
hypothetical agreements used before would be as follows: an agreement between USA and 
Brazil would increase their growth rates by 0.05 and 0.6 percentage points respectively, with 
more that 99% of the effect coming from the absolute RIA variable. For an agreement between 
Canada and Bolivia, the increases in their growth rates would be of 0.0005 and 0.1 percentage 
points respectively. For Canada, 99% of the effect comes from the absolute size of the market, 
although the size of the effects is still very small given the size of Bolivia’s economy, and for 
Bolivia, 49% of the effect would come from the absolute size and 51% would come from the 
relative size of the market. 
 
4.2. ADDRESSING ENDOGENEITY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS 
 
A recurrent problem of cross-country regressions is the possibility of endogeneity in one 
or more of the regressors. Specifically, it might be that fast growing countries, because of some 
observable or unobservable characteristics, are more prone to engage in RIA agreements, 
implying that the relationship between RIAs and growth is not causal.
27 To address the possible 
endogeneity of RIAs I propose the use of geographical regions as instruments for the decision to 
engage in such agreements. It is not hard to see that neighboring countries within geographical 
                                                                                                                                                             
Although these are still present when using decade average the differences should be considerably reduced in the panel 
framework. 
26 I obtained similar results in the panel regressions instrumenting the trading partners’ growth variable, thus correcting for the 
simultaneity problem caused by the use of this variable, which suggests that simultaneity in not a problem in term of generating a 
bias in the estimates of the RIA variables. In addition, all the results are robust to the exclusion of the human capital and 
democracy variables, which increases the sample size to 105 countries. The results are also robust to the use of alternative 
measures of openness and regional spillovers. For openness the alternative measure was the trade tariff revenues as a percentage 
of imports plus exports. Following Moreno and Trehan (1997) alternative measures of regional spillovers were: weighted 
distance to the rest of the world (weight: bilateral trade share), normalized weighted distance to the rest of the world, and 
bordering countries log of GDP. The results are also robust to the exclusion of trading partners’ growth.  
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regions tend to join the same RIAs, and therefore, a set of geographical categorical variables 
would have strong correlation with RIAs and could be used as appropriate instruments.
28 The 
regions I propose as instruments are Oceania, Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas.
29  
Table 7 presents the estimates obtained when I introduce geographical regions as 
instruments for the RIA variables in the cross-section regressions (with 40-year averages) and in 
the panel data regressions (with decade averages). Because the instruments are geographical 
dummy variables, an instrumental variables fixed effects models cannot be estimated, leaving 
random effects as the only estimation procedure available for panel-data models. Columns 1 and 
5 present the results of the regressions with the dummy for participation in RIAs. As in the 
previous results, entering at least one RIA does not affect growth. Columns 2 and 6 display 
estimates including the absolute RIA variable in the cross-section and panel data estimates, 
respectively. The results indicate that the absolute size of the market of countries joining an RIA 
has a strong positive and statistically significant growth effect, with point estimates similar on 
both the cross-section and panel data models.  
The table also reports the F-statistic and the partial R-squared of the excluded instruments 
for the cross-section regressions following Bound et al. (1995). For the absolute RIA variable 
(column 2) they indicate that the instruments are jointly significant at any standard level of 
confidence, and that they explain a large portion (about 56%) of the left out variation of the 
absolute RIA variable, after netting out the effect of all exogenous covariates. However, the 
Hansen’s ‘J’ statistic test of overidentifying restrictions rejects the null hypothesis that the 
proposed instruments are valid. Also, the Hausman specification test—under the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients of instrumental variables and least squares are equal—shows that we cannot 
reject the equality of coefficients and therefore we should keep the estimates obtained with least 
squares (Table 5). 
For the panel data estimate (column 6), the Hausman specification test performed on the 
whole model—under the null hypothesis that the coefficients of instrumental variables random 
                                                                                                                                                             
27 An additional concern might be a causality running directly from growth to RIA. However, Granger causality tests indicate that 
the RIA variable granger-causes growth but growth does not granger-causes the RIA variable. 
28 See Appendix 1 for the list of countries belonging to each agreement. 
29 Given that trading partners’ growth would remain as an endogenous variable in the instrumental variables regressions, the full 
set of excluded instruments is composed by the regions defined above and trading partners’ investment rate.  
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effects and random effects are equal—suggests that a random effect model is more appropriate, 
i.e. the appropriate results are those reported in Table 6a. 
Columns 3 and 7 display the estimates with the relative RIA variable. As in the previous 
results, the relative RIA variable is positive and statistically significant. The instruments do not 
perform as well as with the RIA variable in terms of the F-statistic, and the partial R-squared, 
nevertheless, the overidentification test cannot reject their validity. In addition, the Hausman 
specification test points out again that I should use least squares instead of instrumental 
variables. 
Finally, columns 4 and 8 report results when both RIA variables are included. For both 
models only the absolute RIA variable is statistically significant, however, the F-test indicates 
that they are jointly significant.  
In summary, this section has attempted to deal with a possible problem commonly 
reported in country growth regressions, namely, the potential endogeneity of one of the 
covariates. Specifically, here I have attempted to control for the probable endogeneity of the RIA 
variables. The instruments that I have proposed are geographical regions, and, even recognizing 
that they might be imperfect instruments, they are the best available choice I have to generate an 
exogenous variation in the RIA variables, especially in the absolute RIA variable. 
The general picture that arises from the estimates is that the results are in line with those 
of the literature concerning the lack of any growth effect when measuring regional integration as 
simple dummy variables.  At the same time they are in line with results reported in the previous 
section regarding the role of the market size, suggesting that even after controlling for the 
potential endogeneity of RIAs, regional integration agreements have positive effects on growth. 
 
 
4.3. IS THE DEVELOPMENT LEVEL OF THE PARTNERS IMPORTANT? 
 
In this section I further explore whether regional integration has growth effects by 
looking at the impact of agreements depending on the type of countries joining them. In 
particular, I study whether the level of development of the members plays a role in determining 
growth effects. Even though this question might have been addressed indirectly before in the 
literature, by including dummy variables for different RIA agreements, which might be formed  
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by partners of the same development level, here I introduce a new approach by classifying 
agreements in three categories, namely, North-North, North-South, and South-South, and testing 
if these types of agreements have generated different growth effects. 
In order to implement this strategy, I first classified countries into North and South. 
Following Pritchett (2000) I defined North countries as those belonging to the OECD (except for 
Turkey, Mexico, Hungary, Korea, and Poland), Malta and Cyprus. All other countries were 
classified as South. With this criterion, 15 agreements are classified as North-North, 18 as North-
South, and 37 as South-South. Agreements containing at least one South country were classified 
as North-South. Then, I re-calculated the absolute and relative RIA variables (equations 1 and 2) 
presented in section 3, for each ‘type’ of agreement.
30  
Table 8 summarizes the results of cross-country regressions with forty-year averages.
31 
First, I report the least squares estimates; second, the instrumental variables estimates in which 
only trading partners’ growth is an endogenous variable, and third, the instrumental variables 
estimates in which trading partners’ growth and the RIA variables are endogenous variables. For 
each model the RIA variables for North-North, North-South, and South-South agreements are 
included separately.  
The estimated coefficients displayed in the columns 1 through 3 suggest that North-North 
agreements have positive and significant growth effects. North-South and South-South 
agreements seem to have a positive effect with OLS but the estimated coefficient are not 
significant (column 1). Once I instrument to correct for the simultaneity problem the coefficient 
on North-South agreements becomes significant (column 2). When instrumenting to correct for 
simultaneity and endogeneity of RIAs, only North-North agreements remain significant (column 
3).  
In the instrumental variables regressions (columns 2 and 3), the instruments are jointly 
significant in the first stage regression, and explain a large portion of the unexplained variation in 
the RIA variables.
32 However, the Hausman specification test reported in the table rejects both 
instrumental variables models in favor of the OLS estimates. 
 
                                                 
30 See Appendix 1 for the list of agreements, countries, and the category in which each agreement is classified.  
31 For ease of exposition all other control variables are not reported. 
32 These statistics are not reported in the table but are available upon request.  
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An  F-test of the joint significance on the three RIA variables indicates that they should be 
considered as jointly significant in all three models. This is the result of the combination of a 
high significance level for the North-North variable, which is close to 1% in the three models, 
and the almost significant coefficient for the North-South variable in models 1 and 3.  
In turn, the lack of significance of the North-South variable in the regressions reported in 
columns 1 and 3 could be explained first by the relatively small number of South countries 
engaged in North-South agreements. The reason is the following: if I expect the size—both 
absolute and relative—to have an effect on growth, from the standpoint of North countries both 
RIA variables take low values, since South countries are in general small countries (measured by 
their share in world GDP). Thus, I would expect a relatively small or negligible effect for North 
countries. On the contrary, I should expect a larger effect for South countries, given the larger 
size of North economies. However, existing North-South agreements involve relatively few 
South countries (10) compared to the number of North countries (17), and given the larger 
number of the latter, the results might be influenced by the impact on North countries—
supposedly negligible—rendering the average effect of North-South agreements statistically 
insignificant.  
Additionally, 12 out of 18 of the North-South agreements were signed in the second half 
of the estimation period, with 11 of them signed during the 1990’s. Therefore, if the growth 
effects of regional integration take time to appear it might be that these North-South agreements 
are too recent to show significant growth effects. This should be reflected in the cross-section 
regressions for which I use forty-year averages, but still might be present in the panel-data 
estimations. 
Columns 4, 5 and 6 show the estimates using the relative RIA variable. Again, only 
North-North agreements appear as having growth effects. Both North-South and South-South 
agreements have statistically insignificant estimates; however, it is interesting to notice that the 
relative size of the partners in South-South agreements might have a negative growth effect. This 
result, although not statistically significant, is in line with what was suggested by Venables 
(1999) and Puga and Venables (1998) in that relatively small developing countries might be 
negatively affected by joining an agreement with other relatively large developing countries, i.e., 




Columns 7, 8, and 9, display the estimates including both the RIA variables and the relative RIA 
variables. Taken as a whole they indicate that if any effect is present it might be the one coming 
from North-North agreements. Even though the Hausman specification test indicates that I 
should prefer the least squares estimates, the lack of significance of the RIA variables in column 
7 might be explained again by the lesser variability of the RIA variables due to the reduced 
number of agreements contained in each of them, and the large correlation between them—
specially between the absolute and the relative RIA variables of each type—that might be 
generating multicollineary problems.  
Moving to the panel-data estimates, Table 9 displays the estimates with country fixed 
effects, instrumental variables estimates with country fixed effects that control for the 
simultaneity problem, and instrumental variables estimates with random effects that control for 
both simultaneity and endogeneity of the RIA variables. The use of instrumental variables 
combined with random effects to control for endogeneity is justified by the impossibility of 
estimating an instrumental variables fixed effect models with regional dummy variables as 
instruments. This is due to the time invariant nature of the regional dummies that makes the 
estimation of a fixed effects model infeasible.   
The first three columns indicate again that North-North agreements have generated 
positive and significant growth effects. The Hausman specification tests for the instrumental 
variable regressions indicate that I should use the fixed effects estimates. The primary difference 
with the cross-section estimates is that South-South agreements have a positive and significant 
effect on growth. In addition, the North-South variable has a negative point estimate, although it 
is not significant. 
Columns 4, 5 and 6 include the relative RIA variable. Again North-North agreements 
have a positive and significant effect on growth and, as in the cross-section estimates, South-
South agreements have a negative and significant growth effect. When both the absolute and 
relative RIA variables are included together—columns 7, 8, and 9—the above mentioned results 
remain unchanged: both North-North and South-South agreements have significant growth effect 
with either RIA variable. Furthermore, F-tests indicate that the North-North and South-South 
RIA variables are jointly significant. The Hausman specification test indicates in all cases that 
the country fixed effects models are most appropriate.  
  22
 
With these last estimates we can conclude that North-North agreements have had a positive 
effect on growth, and that the effect of South-South agreements is ambiguous, since the absolute 
size of the market seems to have a positive effect on growth, but the relative size might have a 
negative one. For instance an agreement between Mexico and Panama would increase the growth 
rate of the former by 0.018 percentage points, but would decrease the growth rate of the latter by 
0.66 percentage points. However, an agreement between Egypt and Algeria might increase both 
countries’ growth rates by 0.1 and 0.08 percentage points, respectively. In general, obtaining a 
positive effect from a South-South agreement would depend on the size of each country. 
However I can estimate the minimum size that a country should have to experience positive 






− = ,   
were  rel β  is the point estimate on the relative RIA variable, and  abs β  is the point estimate on the 
absolute RIA variable. If a countries’ share of world GDP is larger than ratio of the RIA 
coefficients, then the expected growth effect of the agreement is positive. Specifically, using the 
point estimates reported in Table 9 column 7, any South country with a share of world GDP 
larger than 0.054 percent would experience an increase in its growth rate. 
The increase in the significance of South-South agreements in the panel-data models is 
additional evidence that given the time structure of the agreements—i.e., a large number of 
North-South and South-South agreements were signed in the second half the period—a cross 
model using averages of a long period might not be the best option as it would tend to 
underestimate the impact of agreements formed towards the end of the estimation period. At the 
same time, the lack of significance of North-South agreements still might be explained by the 
small number of South countries participating in them, and by the fact that they were signed 
relatively late in time. 
Overall, results suggest the existence of positive growth effects from North-North 
agreements and ambiguous effects for North-South agreements. Results for North-South 
agreements are mixed, with some evidence from cross-section regression pointing out that the 
effects might be positive, but with results from panel data estimates indicating ambiguous effect.  
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It is interesting to notice that results on South-South agreements are closely related to predictions 
in Venables (1999) that free trade agreements between developing countries would bring larger 
benefit to those countries with comparative advantages closer to the world average. In his model, 
richer South countries, which are those with larger endowments of capital, would benefit the 
most. In my case, although not necessarily the richer country, larger countries would gain more 
provided that they are sufficiently large. In terms of North-South agreements I cannot provide 
any string evidence in regard to Puga and Venables (1998) hypothesis that North-South 
agreements would generate greater income gains than South-South agreements. Given that 
North-South agreements are both relatively few in number and a recent phenomenon, it is likely 
that the lack of any significant impact result from lack of data; as such, we will have to wait for 





The empirical literature has commonly addressed the question of growth effects of 
regional integration agreements by introducing a dummy variable in growth regressions. The use 
of a dummy throws away interesting information regarding important characteristics of the 
countries in the agreement that can influence the growth effects of regional integration 
agreements.
33 This paper departs from the use of simple dummy variables and contributes to the 
literature by focusing on one of those characteristics: countries’ economic size. If increasing 
returns are present, the size of market matters, and in the context of regional integration it is 
always the case that countries of different size will face a market of different size—the market 
composed by all other countries joining the agreement—and therefore, different growth 
prospects.  
In this paper I first show that using a dummy variable to measure regional integration 
agreements will not produce significant effects on long-run growth. This result is in line with the 
existing empirical literature—among others De Melo et al. (1992) and Vamvakidis (1998 and 
1999).  
                                                 
33 Deardorff and Stern (2002) point out that a dummy variable might be a “too crude” measure.  
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Introducing a new way of measuring RIAs, namely by capturing the partners’ share of world 
GDP, I determine the size of the market incorporated into the domestic market when an 
integration agreement is created. Measuring RIAs in this way, and controlling for other sources 
of growth, allows me to test whether extent-of-the-market effects are present.  
Different estimation procedures—least squares and instrumental variables—provide 
evidence that the partners’ size of the market is a relevant source of economic growth, with 
results varying in magnitude depending on the estimation procedure, but at the same time robust 
to them. Moreover, I find that both the absolute and the relative size of the market matter, 
although the latter is less economically significant. 
The point estimates that I obtain imply important growth effects. For example, Chile, 
which recently signed a Free Trade agreement with the EU, might expect to increase their growth 
rate by about 0.6 percentage points. The expected gain in growth for the EU would be of 0.005 
percentage points given that the gains are tied to size of the market and Chile is a small 
economy. Here, it is necessary to point out that the estimated gains in growth may not be realized 
by particular countries, however, they are suggestive that in the long-run the dynamic effects 
might tend to outweigh the possible static losses of regional integration. 
The paper also studies another characteristic of RIAs that could affect growth, namely, 
the partners’ development stage. When agreements are classified as North-North, North-South 
and South-South, with North being developed countries, I find evidence that North-North 
integration has fostered economic growth. At the same time the effects of South-South 
integration are ambiguous, with negative effects for extremely small countries, but with the 
effect changing to positive for relatively larger South countries. This result is in line with 
Venables (1999) in the sense that in some South-South agreements larger partners would benefit 
at the expense of the small ones.  
For North-South integration the results are not conclusive, but there is some evidence of 
positive effects. A possible explanation for the lack of significant results is that North-South 
integration is a relatively recent trend, with a reduced number of South countries participating in 
it, which might render as inconclusive an econometric estimation for this type of agreements.  
Even though it is difficult not to associate the size of the market to economies of scale, 
this might not necessarily be the only explanation for the growth effects found here. Knowledge  
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spillovers or technological transmissions might be captured by the RIA variables used here, 
making it difficult to separate their effects. While the findings reported in this paper do not allow 
me to conclude with certainty that extent-of-the-market effects are the only force behind the 
growth effects of regional integration, they suggest that the size of the external market is playing 
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Table 1. Notifications to GATT and WTO of








Source: WTO, in World Bank (2000).
Growth 1.96 1.55 -1.64 6.48
Belongs to an RIA 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00
RIA variable 6.29 9.50 0.00 30.38
Relative RIA variable 83.44 326.69 0.00 2309.30
Excluded RIA variable 7.35 0.52 4.70 7.52
Log Initial GDP p.c. 7.50 0.85 5.91 9.20
Government Consumption 14.11 4.57 6.94 30.40
Black Market Premium 59.00 197.91 0.00 1619.21
Investment Rate 21.97 5.35 11.44 34.57
Foreign Direct Investment 1.27 1.13 0.04 7.54
Manufactured Exports 35.12 26.60 0.62 94.08
Human Capital 0.76 0.87 0.01 3.70
Terms of Trade -0.09 1.40 -2.97 5.02
Trade Share of GDP 59.10 40.37 14.79 331.02
Democracy 1.74 6.40 -8.35 10.00
Trading Partners' Growth 2.20 0.48 1.34 3.84
Bordering countries Share of WGDP 3.22 6.42 0.00 36.00
Trading Partners' Investment Rate 22.17 1.38 20.24 26.70
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 38.81 29.64 0.00 90.00
Population over 65 5.27 2.85 1.87 12.04
Number of observations: 81
Table 2. Summary Statistics (1960-1999 averages)









a (60-69) 2.85 2.12 -3.18 9.48
(70-79) 2.85 2.16 -3.12 9.25
(80-89) 0.74 2.22 -5.11 6.26
(90-99) 1.59 1.78 -3.05 6.77
RIA Variable
b (60-69) 1.74 4.34 0.00 14.26
(70-79) 4.52 8.46 0.00 26.17
(80-89) 7.64 12.61 0.00 40.37
(90-99) 10.80 15.12 0.00 68.84
Relative RIA Variable
c (60-69) 72.77 334.42 0.00 2493.88
(70-79) 2.53 7.43 0.00 39.23
(80-89) 114.47 461.23 0.00 3177.25
(90-99) 141.51 520.44 0.00 3564.59
a: Percentage points. 
b: Percentage of World GDP. 



































Table 4. Correlations for Growth and RIA Variables (decade averages)
0.21





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































REGIONAL INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS (CONTINUED) 
 
Agreements notified under GATT Article XXIV* Type of
Date Agreement
a
European Communities (EC) 1958 North-North
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands
Accession of Denmark, Ireland, and United Kingdom  1973 North-North
Accession of Greece  1981 North-North
Accession of Spain and Portugal  1986 North-North
















European Free-Trade Area (EFTA) 1960 North-North
Austria, Denmark, Liechtenstein, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom
EFTA-Finland (full membership in 1986) 1961 North-North
Denmark and United Kingdom leave 1972
Accession of Iceland  1970 North-North
Portugal leaves 1985










United States/Israel 1986 North-South
Canada/Chile 1997 North-South
Canada/Israel 1997 North-South
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 1994 North-South
Canada, Mexico, and United States
Central American Common Market (CACM) 1962 South-South
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua
Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) 1974 South-South
Bahamas (1983), Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti (1997), Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines, and Suriname (1995)
Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA) 1983 North-North
Australia and New Zealand
* Regional integration agreements notified to the GATT/WTO and in force in May 2000 
(excluding RIAs deemed to be inactive as of 1 May 2000). 
  37
APPENDIX 1 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS (CONTINUED) 
 
Agreements notified under the Enabling Clause** Type of
Date Agreement
a
Andean Pact relabeled Andean Group 1969 South-South
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) 1992 South-South












Group of Three 1995 South-South





Costa Rica/CARICOM 1994 South-South
Venezuela/CARICOM 1994 South-South
Mexico/Costa Rica 1995 South-South
Mexico/Nicaragua 1998 South-South
Chile/Peru 1998 South-South
Tripartite Agreement 1968 South-South
Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia
Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) 1966 South-South
relabeled Comunaute Economique et Monetaire d'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC)
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, (Equatorial Guinea (since 1985))
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 1995 South-South
Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe  
Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) 1975 South-South
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leon, and Togo
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) 1992 South-South
Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey
South Asian Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA) 1996 South-South
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka
Bangkok Agreement 1976 South-South
Bangladesh, India, Laos People's Democratic Republic, Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Sri 
Lanka, and Thailand
ASEAN Preferential Trade Arrangements (AFTA) 1977 South-South
Indonesia, Laos (1997), Malaysia, Myanmar (1997), The Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand
** Regional integration agreements notified to the GATT/WTO and in force on 1 January 2000 
(excluding RIAs deemed to be inactive as of 1 January 2000).
a Following Pritchett (2000) North Countries are all OECD Countries (except for Turkey, Mexico, Hungary,
Korea, and Poland), Cyprus and Malta. South Country = Otherwise. Source: Pritchett (2000)
Source: WTO, The World Bank, IADB, the European Union, and Soloaga and Winters (1999). 
  38
APPENDIX 2: VARIABLES, DESCRIPTION, AND DATA SOURCES 
 
Growth: Growth rate of Real GDP Per Capita in constant dollars (international prices, 
base year 1985). Source: Penn World Table 5.6 and World Bank. Missing data calculated from 
1985 GDP per capita and GDP per capita growth rates (Global Development Finance and World 
Development Indicators).  
Initial Income: Log of Real GDP Per Capita in constant dollars (international prices, base 
year 1985). Source: Penn World Table 5.6 and World Bank. Missing data calculated from 1985 
GDP per capita and GDP per capita growth rates (Global Development Finance and World 
Development Indicators). 
Government Consumption: General government final consumption expenditure (% of 
GDP). Source: Global Development Finance & World Development Indicators. 
Black Market Premium: Black Market premium on the official exchange rate. 
( ) [ ] 100 1 * Rate Official Rate Parallel BMP − =  
Source: Levine and Renelt; World's Currency Yearbook (for 1985, 1990-93); Adrian Wood, 
Global trends in real exchange rates: 1960-84, WB Discussion paper no. 35. 1988 (filling in 
missing observations); Global Development Finance and World Development Indicators (for 
1996-1997, calculated as); values for industrial countries are added as 0). 
Investment: Gross domestic investment as % of GDP. Source: World Development 
Indicators 2001. 
Foreign direct investment: Net inflows as % of GDP. Source: World Development 
Indicators 2001 and World Bank. 
Manufactures exports: Ratio of manufactured exports to merchandise exports (%). 
Source: World Development Indicators 2001 
Terms of Trade Shocks: Growth rate of export prices minus growth rate of import prices 
(%). Source: LDB central database. 
Trade Share: Exports and Imports as % of GDP. Source: World Development Indicators 
and Global Development Finance 
Trading Partners’ Growth: Weighted GDP Per Capita growth of Trading Partners.  
  39
( ) ∑ = i i ij j g * ShareT TPG , where   







= , Xij are exports from country i to 
j,  Mij are country’s i imports from j, and gi is the growth rate of country i. Source: IMF: 
Directions of Trade (for trade data); Global Development Finance and World Development 
Indicators (for growth of Real GDP Per Capita in constant dollars at international prices, base 
year 1985) in Easterly (2001). 
Trading Partners’ Investment: Weighted Investment rate of Trading Partners. 
( ) ∑ = i i ij j I * ShareT TPG , where   







= , Xij are exports from country i to 
j, Mij are country’s i imports from j, and Ii is gross domestic investment as % of GDP. Source: 
IMF: Directions of Trade (for trade data), and World Development Indicators 2001 (for 
investment rate). 
Neighbors: Share of World GDP of all neighboring countries. 
( ) ∑ = j j ij i SWGDP * N Neighbors , where Nij is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when 
country j a neighbor of country i, and SWGDPj is the share of world GDP of country j. Source: 
World Development Indicators (for share of World Real GDP). 
Human Capital: Average years of secondary schooling in the total population plus 
average years of higher schooling in the total population. Source: Barro R. and J.W. Lee.  
Democracy: general openness or closedness of political institutions. The operational 
indicator is derived from authority characteristics according to the following criteria: Regulation 
of Executive Recruitment: institutionalized procedures regarding the transfer of executive power. 
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment: extent to which executives are chosen through 
competitive elections. Openness of Executive Recruitment: opportunity for non-elites to attain 
executive office. Executive Constraints: operational (de facto) independence of chief executive. 
Regulation of Participation: development of institutional structures for political expression. 
Competitiveness of Participation: extent to which non-elites are able to access institutional 
structures for political expression. Range = -10 to 10 (-10 = high autocracy; 10 = high 
democracy). Source: Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-
1999. Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of 
Maryland, College Park.  
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Europe Americas Asia Africa Oceania
Austria Argentina China Algeria Australia
Cyprus Barbados India Benin New Zealand
Denmark Bolivia Indonesia Cameroon
Finland Brazil Iran Central African Republic
France Canada Israel Congo
Greece Chile Japan Egypt
Hungary Colombia Jordan Ghana
Iceland Costa Rica Korea Kenya
Ireland Dominican Republic Malaysia Malawi
Italy Ecuador Nepal Mali
Malta El Salvador Pakistan Niger
Netherlands Guatemala Philippines Rwanda
Norway Haiti Singapore Senegal
Portugal Honduras Sri Lanka Sierra Leone
Spain Jamaica Syria South Africa
Sweden Mexico Thailand Sudan
Switzerland Nicaragua Turkey Togo
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